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Abstract. We examine the effect on inequality of increasing one income, and show that for two
wide classes of indices a benchmark income level or position exists, dividing upper from lower
incomes, such that if a lower income is raised, inequality falls, and if an upper income is raised,
inequality rises. We provide a condition on the inequality orderings implicit in two inequality
indices under which the one has a lower benchmark than the other for all unequal income
distributions. We go on to examine the effect on the same indices of simultaneously increasing one
income and decreasing another higher up the distribution, deriving results which quantify the extent
of the Fbucket leak_ which can be tolerated without negating the beneficial inequality effect of the
transfer. Our results have implications for the inequality and poverty impacts of different income
growth patterns, and of redistributive programmes, leaky or not, which are briefly discussed.
Key words: inequality index, inequality ordering, leaky bucket.
1. Introduction
In an unequal two-person society, the effect on inequality of increasing one of the
two incomes is clear: Inequality falls if we increase the lower income of the two,
and rises if we increase the upper income.With more than two people, the effect on
inequality of increasing one income is very much less clear. We obtain a range of
definitive results here, showing that the insight from the two-person society carries
over in essence to inequality indices, if not to the Lorenz configuration. Namely, if a
low income is raised, inequality falls, and if a high income is raised, inequality
rises; and there is a specific income level, or position in the distribution, determined
by the particular inequality index one is using, which divides these effects. We call
this the Fbenchmark_ income or position in what follows.
A condition between two inequality orderings, represented by indices,
emerges which, if satisfied, ensures that the one index has an always lower
benchmark than the other, whatever the income distribution to which both are
applied. This condition evinces a Rawlsian-type measure which we call the
Flower tail concern_ of an inequality ordering.
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We go on to examine the so-called Fleaky bucket paradox_ of Seidl [35]. We
know that a pure rich-to-poor income transfer must reduce inequality for any
Lorenz-consistent inequality index. Seidl demonstrates in respect of the Gini
coefficient that the extent of the transaction cost or inefficiency Fleak_ which can
be tolerated, having taken $1 from a person, and before giving the proceeds to
another person further down the distribution, without negating the beneficial
inequality effect of the transfer, can be surprising. Our analytics enable us to
study this issue in considerable generality. The intuitively expected result is that
the maximum permitted leak would be between 0% and 100%. However, as we
shall show quite generally, not only can this case occur, but also – depending on
the location of Fdonor_ and Frecipient_ relative to the benchmark – the maximum
permitted leak may exceed the amount taken away, so that the Frecipient_ loses as
well as the donor, or be negative, so that the recipient receives more than the
donor gives up – somebody can be adding water to the bucket. This is the Fleaky
bucket paradox_ of Seidl [35], and it extends into a general proposition.
Our findings in this regard are quite distinct from the leaky bucket findings of
authors such as Atkinson [3], Jenkins [23] and Duclos [16] in the welfare
context, in which, following Okun [32, pp. 91–95], the maximum leak before a
welfare loss is experienced is quantified; not least, for any monotonic social
welfare function, such a leak cannot be negative, nor exceed 100%.
We emphasize that our focus is upon inequality per se, and not upon inequality
as an ingredient of a social welfare function. The linkage between inequality and
growth is, of course, much studied. Linkages between income inequality and
aspects of health are also being investigated (Contoyannis and Forster [10];
Deaton and Paxson [12]) as well as between inequality, polarization and social
exclusion (Wolfson [41]; Duclos [15]). Our results will be of interest in all of
these scenarios. There are also implications for redistributive programmes.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the notation
and preliminaries in terms of which the analysis will proceed. In Section 3, we
comment briefly upon the implications for the Lorenz curve of increasing one
income, and establish a central result: A benchmark income or position exists for
any Lorenz-consistent inequality index. In Section 4, we examine the nature and
properties of the benchmark for two wide classes of inequality indices, deriving
explicit results for many familiar indices,1 and a general insight that relates the
benchmark to the lower tail concern of the underlying inequality ordering. In
Section 5, we examine the leaky bucket issue in some depth. Section 6
concludes, with a discussion of some implications of our findings.
2. Notation and preliminaries
Let the population size be N > 2. Income distributions x = (x1, x2, . . . , xi, . . . , xN)
will be assumed throughout to be unequal and non-decreasingly ordered,
x 2 1 ¼ x 2 <Nþþ : x1  x2  . . .  xi  . . .  xN & x1 < xN
 
, with mean
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 xð Þ ¼ 1
N
P
i xi. For technical convenience we have disallowed zero incomes and
will sometimes restrict attention to the subsets 2 ¼ x 2 <Nþþ : x1 < x2  . . .

 xi  . . .  xNg and 3 ¼ x 2 <Nþþ : x1 < x2 < . . . < xi < . . . < xN
  
2  1. For x 2 1, let (x) = min{xi + 1 j xi : xi m xi+1} > 0 be the smallest
gap between two adjacent, non-identical incomes, and for 1 e i e N and 0 <  <
(x) denote by xi the vector obtained from x by adding  to the income of person
i. In general, xi ¼ x1; x2; . . . xi1; xi þ ; xiþ 1; . . . ; xNð Þ 2 1, but if xi = xi + 1 = x
then xi =2 1, whereas its rearrangement (x1, x2, . . . , x, x + , xi + 2. . . , xN), in
which the ranks of persons i and i + 1 are reversed, does belong to 1 (and has
the same Lorenz curve as xi).
2
For a Schur-convex inequality index I : <Nþþ ! < and distribution x 2 1,
and for 1 e i e N and 0 <  < (x), we shall denote by DI(xi, ) the change in
inequality caused by increasing the income of individual i by the amount
 : I xi; ð Þ ¼ I xi
  I xð Þ).
3. General results
The effect on the Lorenz curve for x 2 1 of increasing one income, xi, depends
on which income this is. If the smallest income x1 is unique, i.e. x1 < x2 (so that
x 2 2), and if x1 is increased slightly, the Lorenz curve shifts upwards (just
consider the effect on income shares), whilst if xN is increased, the Lorenz curve
shifts downwards (for all x 2 1, and by similar reasoning). For 1 < i < N, and
also for i = 1 when x 2 1 \ 2 (i.e when x1 = x2), the new Lorenz curve
intersects the old one once, from below (again, just consider the income shares).3
What can we conclude about the effect on inequality indices of raising one
income xi by an amount , where 0 <  < (x)? Clearly, if x 2 2 then DI(x1, ) <
0 for all Lorenz-consistent inequality indices I; and DI(xN, ) > 0 for all x 2 1.
These results for the lowest and highest incomes are in fact enough to establish
the existence of a benchmark income, dividing positive from negative inequality
effects for any Lorenz-consistent inequality index I:
THEOREM 1. Given any Lorenz consistent inequality index I(.), income
distribution x 2 2 and a number  such that 0 <  < (x), there exists a
benchmark income value x* < xN such that xi e x* Á DI(xi, ) e 0 & xi > x* Á
DI(xi, ) > 0.
Proof. It is straightforward that for all x, and for all i and j with














, in other words that x
i
 is obtained from
x j by a progressive transfer of  from j to i. Hence for any Lorenz-consistent
inequality index I, we have I xi
 
< I x j
 
, whence DI(xi, ) < DI(xj, ), 8 i, j =
(1, 2, . . . , N) with xi < xj. Since we already know that, for x 2 2, DI(x1, ) < 0
and DI(xN, ) > 0, necessarily M k < N such that DI(xi, ) e 0 () xi e xk. By
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setting x* equal to xk (or, in fact, equal to any number between xk and xk + 1), we
establish the result. Ì
By this result, we establish the existence of a Fbenchmark_ income value x*
dividing positive from negative inequality effects for the inequality index I(.) and
income distribution x 2 2. Plainly x* need not be unique, for a given discrete
income distribution, but if incomes are dense on (a subset of) the real line, a
unique x* must exist. In fact, for two large classes of inequality indices, the
benchmark income level x* can be uniquely determined, as a well-defined func-
tion of x and the index concerned, as we shall now see.
4. Further analysis for two general classes of indices
Some inequality indices depend on income shares alone, and others depend on
income shares and ranks. We might call such indices rank-independent and rank-
dependent, respectively, or non-positional and positional. Among the positional
indices are the Gini coefficient, the extended Gini coefficients of Donaldson and
Weymark [13], Weymark [39] and Yitzhaki [43], and the FLorenz family_ of
inequality indices introduced by Aaberge [1]. These are all members of the gen-
eral class of Flinear measures_ identified by Mehran [29]. Most of the familiar
non-positional indices are related in one way or another to the generalized en-
tropy family, shown by Bourguignon [5], Cowell [11] and Shorrocks [36] to be
the unique additively decomposable indices. The mean logarithmic deviation and
Theil index belong to the generalized entropy class, and the coefficient of varia-
tion and Atkinson index are monotonic transformations of indices in this class.
We analyze indices of the two types separately here, using suitable general forms
and then proceeding to specific indices afterwards. As we shall see, Theorem 1
extends from 2 to 1 for the non-positional indices, and provides a unique
benchmark relative income z* = x*/(x), whilst for the positional indices, the
benchmark can be expressed as a position (rank) rather than an income level
when x 2 3.
4.1. THE NON-POSITIONAL INDICES OF RELATIVE INEQUALITY FOR THE CLASS 1
Many non-positional indices, including all the ones we have cited, can either be
written in the form:
J xð Þ ¼ 1=N½ 
X
i
u xi= xð Þð Þ ð1Þ
where u: <þþ ! < is a twice-differentiable function such that u00 does not
change sign, or are monotonic transformations of something in this form. Let I(x)
be such an inequality index; suppose that:
I xð Þ ¼ h J xð Þð Þ ð2Þ
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for all x 2 1 where h: < ! < is differentiable and such that h0 does not change
sign. For the transfer principle to hold, we require that h0(J) > 0 if u0 is monotone
increasing, and h0(J) < 0 if u0 is monotone decreasing (recall that u00 does not
change sign).4
This form encompasses most of the familiar non-positional inequality indices.
For the mean logarithmic deviation D, set u(z) = jln(z) and h(J) = J. The Theil
index T is given by u(z) = z ln(z) and h(J) = J. (Both of these require normalized
incomes z to be non-zero, which is true for x 2 1). The generalized entropy
class comprises indices E(c), c 2 <, of which E(0) = D, E(1) = T and E(c), c m
0,1 obtains when u(z) = zcj 1 and h(J) = J/[c(cj 1)]. For the coefficient of
variation CV, set u(z) = (zj 1)2 and h(J) = J1/2. For the Atkinson index A(e),
where e > 0 is the inequality aversion parameter, set u(z) = z1je and h(J) = 1 j
J1/(1je) when e m 1 and set u(z) = ln (z) and h(J) = 1 j eJ when e = 1. The
coefficient of variation and Atkinson index for 0 < e m1 are monotonic trans-
formations of generalized entropy indices: CV = ¾[2E(2)] and A(e) = 1j [1 j
e(1j e)E(1j e)]1/(1je).
THEOREM 2. Let I be a non-positional inequality index defined as in (1) and
(2), let x 2 1. and let zi = xi /(x) be income normalized by the mean, 1 e i e N.
Then ¯I/¯xk
>
<0 () zk>< z* where z* is uniquely defined by u0(z*) = [1/N].~ziu0(zi).
Proof. First, differentiate in (1) with respect to the income being increased,
















(in this, we have written  for (x)). Now differentiate in (2), substitute from (3)
and rearrange:




u0 xk=ð Þ  1=N½ 
X
i
xi=ð Þu0 xi=ð Þ
n o
ð4Þ
With z* defined as in the statement of the theorem, (4) becomes:
@I=@xk ¼ h0 Jð Þ=N½  u0 zkð Þ  u0 z*ð Þf g ð5Þ
from which the result follows (since h0 > 0 if u0 is increasing and h0 < 0 if u0 is
decreasing). Ì
As this result demonstrates, the function u and income distribution x together
uniquely determine the benchmark income level
x* ¼  xð Þ:z* ð6Þ
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dividing positive from negative inequality effects, for all indices in our non-
positional class (and for 1 rather than the restricted 2 of Theorem 1; ties, as in
1 \ 2, are immaterial for the non-positional indices). Notice that the function u
alone defines the inequality ordering induced by I, and determines the
benchmark, whereas the function h is also needed for the definition of I. It is
now straightforward to obtain the benchmark income level for each of the
familiar indices we have shown to be members of the non-positional class. For
the mean logarithmic deviation D, for which u(z) = jln(z) and u0(z) = j1/z, the
critical z* value is zD = 1. Hence, if an above-average income is increased
(slightly), D rises, and if a below-average income is raised, D falls. For the Theil
index T, for which u(z) = zln(z) and u0(z) = 1 + ln(z), we have zT ¼ eT ; for the
generalized entropy index E(c), we have zE(c) = [1 + c(c j 1)E(c)]
1/(cj1) (c m
0,1); for the coefficient of variation, zCV = 1 + CV
2; and for the Atkinson index
zA(e) = [1 j A(e)]
(ej1)/e (e m 1) and zA(1) = 1.
There are some equivalences within this set of results. For example, using
E(2) = 1/2CV2, we see that zE(2) = [1 + 2E(2)] = zCV. This is as it ought to be,
since the two indices are monotonically related. It can also be shown that
lim
c!0
zE cð Þ ¼ 1 ¼ zD ¼ zA 1ð Þ, lim
c!1
zE cð Þ ¼ eT ¼ zT and zA(e) = zE(1je) for e m 1. These
results clearly show that substantial change in the benchmark is possible – in-
deed almost inevitable – when changing the inequality index used for the
measurement.
Let us now examine the benchmark zE(c) for the generalized entropy fam-
ily more closely. Define mc ¼ 1N
PN
i¼1
zci and Mc = {mc}
1/c as the moment of order
c and mean of order c, respectively, in the distribution of the z’s. Then zE(c) =
{Mc}
c/(cj1) for c m 0,1. The properties of Mc as a function of c, for a given
distribution, are well-known in the statistical literature5, and can be used to
derive properties of the benchmark. In particular, for any given income
distribution x, zE(c) is continuous and increasing in c, and ranges in value from
the minimum income relative to the mean, z1, to the maximum, zN: That is, zE(c)
Y z1 as c Y jV and zE(c) Y zN as c Y +V. A particular consequence is that, for
each person k in an income distribution x 2 1 there exists a unique c 2 < such
that zE(c) = xk/: Each person can be considered to be at the benchmark position
for exactly one generalized entropy index. Figure 1, obtained by simulation,
shows graphs of Mc and zE(c) against c for the income distribution ($200, $500,
$800, $1,100, $2,400).
We noted in Section 3 that for 1 < k < N, and also for k = 1 when x2 1\2
(i.e when x1 = x2), the new Lorenz curve, after xk has been increased, intersects
the old one once from below. Shorrocks and Foster [37] address such situations.
They show that if the coefficient of variation is thereby increased, then inequality
goes up for every transfer-sensitive inequality index I. Hence, if xk/ > zCV then
¯I/¯xk > 0 for all transfer-sensitive inequality indices I. It follows that zCV = 1 +
CV2 is an upper bound for the benchmarks z* in the sub-class of non-positional
indices which are also transfer-sensitive.6
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Further insight into the relationship between the inequality ordering and bench-
mark income level can be gained with a simple transformation. Let i = zi/N be
person i’s income share, 1 e i e N, so that ~i = 1. Now set U(z) = u0(z) where u
is the function in (1) determining the inequality ordering. From Theorem 2, the
benchmark income relative to the mean satisfies this equation:
U z*ð Þ ¼
X
iU zið Þ ¼ E U Zð Þ½  ð7Þ
where Z is a risky prospect in which the return is zi with probability i, 1 e i e N.
That is, z* = x*/ is the certainty equivalent of Z for the Futility function_ U, in
the sense of Pratt [34]. An extension of the Pratt theorem confirms the following
result, linking the (relative) risk aversion of U, which takes the form:
Pu Zð Þ ¼ zu000 zð Þ
.
u00 zð Þ; ð8Þ
with the position of the benchmark:7
THEOREM 3. Let I and Iˆ be inequality indices defined as in (1) and (2) by,
respectively, h and u and hˆ and uˆ, where Pu(z) > Puˆ(z) 8z. Then for all unequal
income distributions x 2 1, the benchmark income for I is less than that for
I^ : x* < x^*.
The higher is the measure Pu(z) 8z, the more confined is the lower-tail region
[0, x*] in which an increase in a person’s income is regarded as an inequality
Figure 1. The generalized entropy benchmark as a function of the parameter c for the
income distribution ($200, $500, $800, $1,100, $2,400).
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improvement, whatever the income distribution. In a clear sense, then, an
inequality ordering with a higher Pu-measure is Fmore Rawlsian._
DEFINITION 1. The function Pu zð Þ ¼ zu00 zð Þ
	
u00 zð Þ defined in (8) will be said
to measure the Flower tail concern_ of the non-positional inequality ordering
defined by u in (1), of which the inequality index I defined in (2) is a cardinal
representation.8
All the specific indices we have been considering in fact have constant lower
tail concern. This is because they all represent inequality orderings implicit in
generalized entropy indices, for which u(z) = zc whence PE(c)(z) = 2 j c, 8z. It
follows from Theorem 3 that the benchmark income for E(c) is an increasing
function of c whatever the income distribution x, as evidenced in Figure 1 for a
specific income distribution. It can be checked directly, by inspecting the
relevant u-functions, that for the mean logarithmic deviation, PD(z) = 2, 8z; for
the Theil index, PT(z) = 1, 8z; for the coefficient of variation, PCV(z) = 0, 8z; and
for the Atkinson index, PA(e)(z) = e + 1, 8z.
The configuration of benchmarks for any two of the inequality indices we
have catalogued can thus be ascertained, whatever the income distribution, by a
simple comparison of scalar magnitudes. Notice that the inequality orderings
with (constant) negative lower tail concern are precisely those represented by the
generalized entropy indices E(c) for c > 2. This ties in with a remark of
Shorrocks [36, p. 623], that the indices E(c), c > 2 Bshow little concern for
equalization, except possibly among the very rich.^ In fact, within our class of
non-positional indices, the sub-class having positive lower tail concern are
precisely those which satisfy Kolm’s [25] Principle of Diminishing Transfers. 9
4.2. THE POSITIONAL INDICES OF RELATIVE INEQUALITY FOR THE CLASS 3
Here we shall consider inequality indices in which people’s incomes are
weighted according to their positions in the distribution. Specifically, let M(x)
take the form
M xð Þ ¼ 1=N½  X
i
w ið Þxi= ð9aÞ
for x 2 3, where w: < ! < is such that ~iw(i) = 0 and w(i + 1) > w(i) for i =
1,2, . . . N j 1.
This specification covers the Gini coefficient G, for which wG(i) = (2i j N j
1)/N, the extended Gini coefficient G(n), n > 1, of Weymark [39], Donaldson and
Weymark [13, 14] and Yitzhaki [43], for which wG(n)(i) = N.{[(N j i)/N]
n j
[(Nj i + 1)/N]n}+ 1 (the case n = 2 being that of the ordinary Gini coefficient),10
and the illfare-ranked S-Gini coefficient S(b), 0 e b < 1, of Donaldson and
Weymark [13], for which wS(b)(i) = 1 j N.{[i/N]
b j [(i j 1)/N]b}.
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Going slightly further, we shall assume that in (9a), the function w: < ! < is
strictly increasing and twice differentiable. Setting !(p) = w(Np), so that ! :
0; 1½  ! < ascribes weights by rank, (9a) becomes:
M xð Þ ¼ 1=N½ X
i
! pið Þxi= ð9bÞ
in which the rank of income xi is written as pi = i/N, so that !(pi) = w(i). This
version of (9a) exactly describes the class of so-called Flinear inequality
measures_ identified by Mehran [29] and further studied by Weymark [39] and
Yaari [42].11
THEOREM 4. Let M be a positional inequality index defined for x 2 3 as in





< 0, k>< k* where k* = wj1(M(x)).




@xk ¼ w kð Þ M½ 
	
N½ >< 0, w kð Þ><M ð10Þ
We know that ¯M/¯xN > 0 from Theorem 1. Hence w(N) > M; and since ~i w(i) =
0 by assumption, and w is increasing, we must have w(1) < 0. Then by continuity
and monotonicity, there exists a unique real number k* such that w(k*) = M.
This, with (10), proves the result. Ì
We have established the existence of a benchmark position, k*, for indices in
the positional class. Of course, k* is unlikely to be an integer. It depends on the
income distribution as well as upon the inequality index M itself. For the Gini
coefficient, we have kG* = [N(1 + G) + 1]/2 > N/2, whence the benchmark is
above the median (and by more, the more unequal is the distribution). For the
extended Gini coefficient G(n), the benchmark position kG(n)* is the solution to the
equation wn(k) = G(n), or [(N j k + 1)/N]
n j [(N j k)/N]n = [1 j G(n)]/N,
which is difficult to obtain explicitly. However, an approximation to kG(n)* can be
obtained quite easily. Define a function g(s) = sn, so that s* = (N j kG(n)* )/N is the
solution of [1 j G(n)]/N = g(s + 1/N) j g(s). For large N, g(s + 1/N) j g(s) $
nsnj1/N, whence s* $ {[1 j G(n)]/n}1/(n j 1) i.e. kG(n)* $ N[1 j {[1 j G(n)]/
n}1/(nj1)]. In the case n = 2, this approximation becomes kG(2)* $ N[1 + G]/2,
whilst the true value, kG* , is [N(1 + G) + 1]/2 which is higher by 1/2. Hence the
approximate benchmark is at most one position too high in this case. For the
illfare-ranked S-Gini, by similar reasoning kS(b)* $ N{[1 j S(b)]/b}1/(bj1)].13 For
Aaberge’s Lorenz family B(k), the benchmark position is given by kB(k)* =
N[(kB(k) + 1)/(k + 1)]1/k.
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We saw in Section 3 that for x 2 1 and for any k for which 1 < k < N, an
increase in xk causes a Lorenz shift involving a single intersection from below.
Zoli [45] addresses such situations. He shows that if the Gini coefficient is
thereby increased, then inequality goes up for all relative inequality indices I
satisfying the positional transfer-sensitivity principle.14 That is, if k > kG* =
[N(1 + G) + 1]/2, then ¯M / ¯xk > 0 for all such indices M. Therefore kG* is an
upper bound for the benchmarks k* in the sub-class of positional inequality
indices which also satisfy the Positional Principle of Transfer Sensitivity (in
particular, kG* Q kG(n)* for all n > 2).
A link between the lower tail concern of the inequality ordering represented
by a positional inequality index M and the location of the benchmark k* obtains,
just as it did for the non-positional class in Theorem 3. Again setting i = zi / N
as person i’s income share, and treating it as a probability, and now using version
(9b) of the definition of M, we have from (10) that the benchmark position k*
satisfies this equation:
! p*ð Þ ¼
X
i! pið Þ ¼ E ! Kð Þ½  ð11Þ
where p* = k*/N and K is a risky prospect in which the return is pi with
probability i, 1 e i e N. That is, k*/N is the certainty equivalent of K for !, in
the sense of Pratt [34]. Now define
Q! pð Þ ¼ p!00 pð Þ=!0 pð Þ ð12Þ
as the relative risk aversion of the Futility_ function !.
DEFINITION 2. The function Q!(p) = j p!00(p)/!0(p) defined in (12) will be
said to measure the lower tail concern of the positional inequality index M
defined in (9b).
THEOREM 5. Let M and M^ be positional inequality indices defined for x 2 3
as in (9b) by, respectively, ! and !^, where Q! pð Þ > Q!^ pð Þ8p. Then for all
unequal income distributions x 2 3, the benchmark position is lower for M than
for M^ : k* < k^*.
For the positional indices, lower tail concern Q!(p) is measured in terms of
rank p (rather than relative income z), and is given by the concavity of the
weighting function !. The higher is the measure Q!(p) 8p, the more confined is
the set of lower tail positions 1 e k < k* in which an increase in a person’s
income is regarded as an inequality improvement. If the population size N is
large, the illfare-ranked S-Gini has constant (and positive) lower tail concern:
QS(b)(p) = 2 j b 8p (see footnote 11). Aaberge’s Lorenz family also exhibits
constant, though non-positive, lower tail concern: QB(k)(p) = 1 j k (where k is a
positive integer). If we had defined Q!(p) slightly differently, as Q!* (p) = j(1 j
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p)!00(p)/!0(p), which would have no effect on the validity of the theorem, then it
would be the extended Gini that had constant lower tail concern: QG(n)* (p) = n j
2 8p. This brings out a link between our tail concern measure and the Positional
Principle of Transfer Sensitivity: Within the positional class, the sub-class having
positive lower tail concern are precisely those which satisfy this Principle.15
5. The leaky bucket
We now address the leaky bucket issue. Suppose that, in an unequal distribution
x, a small amount  is taken from individual ‘ and an amount q is given to
individual j who is lower down the distribution j < ‘ð Þ. The effect on any
differentiable inequality index I is readily obtained using the total differential:
dI ¼ q@I	@xj  @I=@x‘
  ð13Þ
for an infinitesimally small . If x 2 1 then xj  x‘, whilst if x 2 3 (or if ‘ ¼ 2
and x 2 2) then xj < x‘. As before, we can deal with the general case of x 2 1
for the non-positional indices, but will restrict attention to x 2 3 and 0 <  <
(x) for the positional ones. In both cases, the index is then differentiable. The
value q0 for which dI = 0 reveals the information we seek about the permitted
leakiness of the bucket for a non-adverse inequality effect:
q0 ¼ @Ið:Þ=@x‘
@Ið:Þ	@xj ð14Þ
The maximum permitted rate of leakage is (1 j q0). The intuitively agreeable
scenario, that the size of the leak would not erase completely the amount of
income to be received by the poor, corresponds to 0 < q0 < 1, whilst the other
two cases, already identified by Seidl [35] in the case of the Gini coefficient and
termed Fparadoxical,_ that the leak could exceed 100% or even be negative,
correspond to q0 < 0 and q0 > 1, respectively. As we shall see, it is possible to
predict the circumstances in which each of these three cases occurs for all
inequality indices in our two classes.
5.1. THE NON-POSITIONAL INDICES OF RELATIVE INEQUALITY
For an inequality index I defined as in (1) and (2), we obtain
q0 ¼ u
0 z‘ð Þ  u0 z*ð Þ
u0 zj
  u0 z*ð Þ ð15Þ
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from (14), using (5). Since u0 is monotonic, it follows16 that the magnitude of the
maximum permitted leak (1 j q0) depends crucially upon which side of the
benchmark the donor and recipient lie:
THEOREM 6. Let I be a non-positional inequality index defined as in (1) and
(2). The fraction q0 of a small amount  taken from individual ‘ which must reach
individual j (where j < ‘) for inequality neutrality depends upon the incomes of
‘ and j relative to the benchmark income x* as follows:
(i) x* > x‘ > xj ) 0 < q0 < 1
(ii) x‘ > x* > xj ) q0 < 0
(iii) x‘ > xj > x*) q0 > 1
Themagnitude of the effect on inequality, of a leaky transfer from ‘ to j, depends
on whether q><q0, of course, as well as on the values zj = xj/, z‘ ¼ x‘= and z* =
x*/ : For any non-positional index, inequality increases or decreases according
to the inefficiency level and the relative incomes of the individuals affected. Case
(i), in which 0 < q0 < 1, is the one typically envisaged, and, our analytics reveal,
it can occur only when both the donor and recipient are below the benchmark. In
all other configurations of donor and recipient, the permitted leakage will either
exceed theamount takenaway(q0 < 0 i.e., (1j q0) > 1), so that the Frecipient_may
lose too,orbenegative, so that the recipientmayreceivemore than thedonorgivesup
(q0 > 1 i.e., (1 j q0) < 0) with no adverse effect on inequality.
One can readily obtain the value of q0 for any particular index using (15) and

















; for the coefficient of variation CV, qCV ¼ z‘zCVzjzCV ; for the Atkinson









¼ qE 1eð Þ for 0 < e m 1 and qA(1) = qD.
In Table I, we illustrate how the benchmark income level x* and maximum
permitted rate of leakage 1 j q0 vary with inequality aversion e for the Atkinson
index A(e), using the income distribution ($200, $500, $800, $1,100, $2,400)
again and choosing ‘ ¼ 4 and j = 2. When $1 is taken from the person with
$1,100 and an amount $q is given to the person with $500, the leak $(1j q) can
be as big as the value 1 j q0 = 1 j qA(e) shown in the table before an inequality
effect judged to be adverse would occur. As is clear, all three cases 0 < q0 < 1,
q0 < 0 and q0 > 1 of Theorem 6 arise, for different ranges of inequality aversion
e. In each such range the maximum permitted rate of leakage increases with e.
Figure 2 shows the maximum permitted rate of leakage 1 j qE(c) for the class
of generalized entropy indices E(c) as a function of the parameter c, for this same
income distribution, using the scenario ‘ ¼ 4 and j = 2 of Table I and three others
each involving the richest and/or poorest person in the transfer. The results for
the Atkinson index A(e) for 0 < e m 1 occur for c < 1 (recall that qE(1je) = qA(e)).
Panel 1 of Figure 2 thus replicates and extends the maximum leak values given in
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Table I. It is clear from panels 3 and 4, however, that it is not always the case for
the Atkinson index that the maximum permitted leak increases with inequality
aversion.
When the richest person is the donor, in this example the maximum leak
decreases with e in some or all ranges. A fortiori, there can be no clear general
relationship between the lower tail concern of a non-positional inequality
ordering, as measured by Pu(z), and the maximum leak 1 j q0: An intuition that
a more lower tail concerned inequality ordering would countenance bigger leaks,
though tempting, must be wrong.
Our findings in Table I and Figure 2 may be set alongside those of Atkinson
[3, p. 42] and Jenkins [23, pp. 28–9], which relate to the maximum tolerable leak
for an Atkinson index before a welfare loss is experienced (rather than, as here,
before inequality is exacerbated). Because the efficiency aspect gets taken into
account in welfare, measured in these studies as [1 j A(e)], it is clear that very
Table I. The benchmark income level x* and maximum permitted rate of leakage 1jqA(e) as a
function of inequality aversion for the income distribution ($200, $500, $800, $1,100, $2,400)
when ‘ = 4 and j = 2
e A(e) x* 1 j qA(e) Theorem 6, case:
0.1 0.0272 1,282.1811 0.8436 (i) x* > x4 > x2
Á 0 < q0 < 10.2 0.0546 1,251.5924 0.8701
0.3 0.0819 1,220.6203 0.8967
0.4 0.1092 1,189.3367 0.9234
0.5 0.1363 1,157.8210 0.9503
0.6 0.1632 1,126.1599 0.9774
0.8 0.2162 1,062.7796 1.0328 (ii) x4 > x* > x2
Á q0 < 01 0.2673 1,000.0000 1.0909
1.2 0.3160 938.6666 1.1535
1.4 0.3617 879.6041 1.2230
1.6 0.4041 823.5476 1.3033
1.8 0.4428 771.0817 1.4001
2 0.4778 722.6008 1.5222
2.2 0.5092 678.2984 1.6849
2.4 0.5370 638.1840 1.9160
2.6 0.5615 602.1179 2.2737
2.8 0.5831 569.8547 2.9028
3 0.6020 541.0856 4.2955
3.2 0.6186 515.4730 9.8986
3.5 0.6398 482.2325 j6.9382 (iii) x4 > x2 > x*
Á q0 > 14 0.6673 438.0625 j1.3731
5 0.7032 378.4391 j0.3241
6 0.7247 341.3486 j0.1117
7 0.7387 316.5664 j0.0423
10 0.7608 275.9386 j0.0026
20 0.7823 234.9238 j0.0000
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big leaks could not be tolerated; Atkinson and Jenkins found maximum permitted
leaks in the range 33%–75% for their particular numerical scenarios.
5.2. THE POSITIONAL INDICES OF RELATIVE INEQUALITY
If x 2 3 and if 0 <  < (x) then the resultant income distribution after the
transfer, which is x‘
 j
þq, also belongs to 3. Thus the form given in (9a) for a
positional index M(.) applies. Substituting from (10) into (14), the value of q0 for
the index M is:
q0 ¼ w ‘ð Þ M
w jð Þ M ð16Þ
Now recall from Theorem 4 that the benchmark position for M is k* = wj1(M).
Table II. The benchmark position k* and maximum permitted rate of leakage 1 j qG(v) as a
function of inequality aversion for the same income distribution ($200, $500, $800, $1,100,
$2,400) when ‘ = 4 and j = 2
n G(n) k* 1 j qG(n) Theorem 7, case:
1.2 0.1196 4.4054 0.7464 (i) k* > 4 > 2
Á 0 < q0 < 11.4 0.2140 4.2976 0.8243
1.6 0.2894 4.1941 0.8918
1.8 0.3502 4.0949 0.9499
2 0.4000 4.0000 1.0000
3 0.5520 3.5895 1.1628 (ii) 4 > k* > 2
Á q0 < 04 0.6285 3.2724 1.2446
5 0.6749 3.0244 1.2980
6 0.7060 2.8249 1.3495
7 0.7282 2.6607 1.4141
8 0.7444 2.5225 1.5053
9 0.7566 2.4046 1.6415
10 0.7659 2.3026 1.8568
11 0.7731 2.2135 2.2286
12 0.7787 2.1351 2.9848
13 0.7831 2.0655 5.2139
14 0.7866 2.0034 84.5591
15 0.7893 1.9477 j4.6751 (iii) 4 > 2 > k*
Á q0 > 116 0.7915 1.8975 j2.0133
17 0.7932 1.8521 j1.1755
18 0.7946 1.8108 j0.7730
20 0.7965 1.7386 j0.3936
25 0.7989 1.6028 j0.1036
30 0.7996 1.5083 j0.0319
40 0.8000 1.3866 j0.0033
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Hence
q0 ¼ w ‘ð Þ  w k*ð Þ
w jð Þ  w k*ð Þ ð17Þ
(compare this with (15), which expresses q0 in a similar form for the non-
positional indices). The following results are immediate, given that w(.) is strictly
increasing:
THEOREM 7. Let M be a positional inequality index defined for x 2 3 as in
(9a), with w: < ! < continuous and strictly monotone increasing. The fraction
q0 of a small amount 0 <  < (x) taken from individual ‘ which must reach
individual j (where j < ‘ ) for inequality neutrality depends upon the positions of
‘ and j relative to the benchmark position k* as follows:
(i) k* > ‘ > j) 0 < q0 < 1
(ii) ‘ > k* > j) q0 < 0
(iii) ‘ > j > k*) q0 > 1
The case 0 < q0 < 1 occurs only when both the donor and recipient are
positioned below the benchmark k*. In all other configurations, the permitted
leakage will either exceed the amount taken away (q0 < 0), so that the Frecipient_
may lose too, or be negative, so that the recipient may receive more than the
donor gives up (q0 > 1) with no adverse effect on inequality. These results
are analogous to the ones in Theorem 6 for the non-positional indices, in which
the benchmark income level forms the divide; for the positional indices, it is the
benchmark position which takes this role.
In the case of the Gini coefficient, for which w(i) = (2i j N j 1)/N, we have
qG ¼ ‘ kG*ð Þ= j kG*ð Þ where kG* = [N(1 + G) + 1]/2. Seidl [35] obtained
essentially this result by other means. The expression for q0 for the extended Gini
coefficient G(n), n > 1, which is more complex, obtains by substituting wG(n)(i) =
N{[(N j i)/N]n j [(N j i + 1)/N]n} + 1 and M = G(n) in (16).
Noting that for large N, wG(n)(i) $ [1 j n.{(N j i)/N}nj1]/N, so that q0
can be approximated from (17) as q0 


N  kG vð Þ*
 1  N  ‘ð Þv1	
 Nð
kG vð Þ* Þv1  N  jð Þv1

, it follows from the further approximation kG vð Þ*  N

1 1 G vð Þ½ =vf g1= v1ð Þ already noted that qG vð Þ  1G vð Þv 1plð Þv1
1G vð Þ 1pjð Þv1 where pj and
pl are the ranks of j and l, respectively. Analogously, for the illfare-ranked S-





for large N. For the Lorenz family of Aaberge [1], we







In Table II, we illustrate for the extended Gini coefficient how the benchmark
position kG(n)* and maximum permitted rate of leakage 1 j qG(n) vary with the
distributional judgment parameter n, using the same income distribution as in
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Table I and choosing ‘ = 4 and j = 2 as before. The cases 0 < q0< 1, q0 < 0 and
q0 > 1 of Theorem 7 all arise.
Figure 3 shows the dependence of 1 j qG(n) on n graphically, for the same
four scenarios as used in Figure 2 for 1 j qE(c). As before, we see non-
monotonicity in some scenarios between n and 1 j qG(n). For the positional
indices too, then, there can be no general link between the degree of lower tail
concern of the inequality ordering and the maximum permitted leak.17 The
leakage rates shown in Table II and Figure 3 may be compared with those of
Duclos [16, p.149–150], who calculates the maximum tolerable leaks for no
welfare loss, where welfare is measured as [1 j G(n)]. Duclos’s maximum
leaks are shown for various scenarios to be increasing in n and lying between
6.7% and 99.6%.
There is an analytical connection between our maximum leakage rate (1j q0)
for inequality and those of Atkinson, Jenkins and Duclos for welfare. Letting
welfare be evaluated asW = [1j I], where I is an inequality index in one of our
two classes whose range is contained in the interval [0,1] (such as the Atkinson






: (compare with (13)). The maximum permitted leak for
a non-adverse welfare effect, call it 1 j qW, occurs at the value of q for which
dW = 0. It can easily be shown, in fact for any monotonic social welfare function,
that 1 j qW lies between 0 and 1. The welfare and inequality leakage rates in our
case are linked by an equation of the form:
1 qWð Þ ¼ 1 q0ð Þ:l ð18Þ
in which l 2 (jV,1) is a term that depends on the position of the recipient j
relative to the benchmark.18
6. Summary and conclusions
It is important for economists to be able to compare inequality in income
distributions with different means. Incomes can change due to growth, and also
due to disincentive effects arising from the implementation of redistributive
programmes. It is perhaps surprising, then, that one can find little in the
inequality measurement literature about the inequality consequences of a single
income growing, or of a single leaky transfer. The effects on welfare of such
changes have, of course, been much discussed; our results in this paper have
thrown light on the corresponding questions for inequality.
First, we looked at the effect on inequality of increasing one income. We
confirmed the casual intuition that increasing a low income should reduce
inequality and increasing a high one should surely raise it. In fact we proved that,
for large classes of inequality indices, there is a benchmark income level or
position dividing the two responses, which is different for each inequality index
and income distribution. This benchmark can be both quantified and systemat-
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ically related to a property of the underlying inequality ordering, its lower tail
concern. The intuition for the aggregate, offered up by our analysis, that income
growth in the lower part of a distribution will be equalizing, and income growth
in the upper part disequalizing, seems unexceptionable, but it surely has not been
appreciated before now that the divide between Flower_ and Fupper_ that supports
this intuition could differ so markedly for different inequality indices, and its
determinants be understood.19 In the pro-poor growth literature, which has lately
departed from that on the growth-inequality relationship, a significant strand now
focuses on the growth elasticity of poverty according to various measures. See
Foster and Sze´kely [20] for a discussion of this trend, and for a proposal that
essentially reduces to computing pro-poorness as the growth elasticity of the
Atkinson inequality index A(e), whose benchmark income level, call it x*(e),
equals [1 j A(e)](ej1)/e when e m 1 and  when e = 1. An implication is that all
growth taking place entirely below x*(e) counts as pro-poor, whilst growth
taking place entirely above x*(e) may or may not do so, depending on its effect
on ; our analysis exposes this property, which holds without regard to any
assumed poverty line.
The analytics we have pursued here in respect of Fchanging one income_ can
surely be taken further. The inequality index form I = [1/N]. ~i w(i)u(xi /) could
be a starting point. This form embeds both our non-positional and positional
classes, and would cover, for example, Berrebi and Silber’s [4] construction.20
Ebert [18] specifies a class of inequality indices which cuts across our two,
containing some of the generalized entropy indices (those for which c < 1) and
all of the Gini, extended Gini and S-Ginis, along with other indices which have
not gained currency. Mosler and Muliere [31] specify a class of indices obeying
the Fstar-shaped principle of transfers_, according to which only those rich-to-
poor transfers which take place across a specific income value or position  need
reduce inequality. The extension of our results to these and other classes is left
for future research.
In the second part of the paper, we turned to the leaky bucket scenario. We
took for granted a rate of leakage (1 j q) from the bucket and asked the
question, how leaky would the bucket have to be before the intended inequality-
ameliorating effect of a single rich-to-poor transfer would be negated? The
answer was (1 j q0), with q0 depending on the relative incomes or ranks of the
donor and recipient, and, crucially, on which side of the benchmark they are
located. We showed that a negative rate of leakage or even one exceeding 100%
could be countenanced for some configurations. Only in case the donor and
recipient are both in the lower part of the distribution is there a bound 0 < (1 j
q0) < 1. So here too, we obtain an insight for the aggregate: The inefficiencies of
redistributive programmes had better not be focussed entirely within the lower
part of an income distribution.21
A further insight arises in the context of tax-transfer policy in a socially
heterogeneous population of households, even in the absence of efficiency losses.
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Let ‘ and j be two households, selected as the donor and recipient for a money
transfer, respectively. If the equivalence scale deflators for ‘0s and j’s money
incomes are m‘ and mj, each unit reduction in the living standard of ‘ is
accompanied by an increase of q ¼ m‘
	
mj units in the living standard of j. We
can apply Theorems 6 and 7, to examine the effect of the (non-leaky) money
transfer on inequality in the distribution of living standards for any non-
positional or positional index. If j is below the benchmark in the living standards
distribution, inequality reduction requires q > q0 (where 0 < q0 < 1 if ‘ is also
below the benchmark, and q0 < 0 if ‘ is above it); and if j is above the
benchmark, inequality reduction requires q < q0 (in this case q0 > 1).
22 These
results pick up on, and extend, an insight of Glewwe [21], that some money
transfers from the better-off to the worse-off can exacerbate inequality. Transfers
taking place entirely below the benchmark may do this if from a less needy to a
very needy type of household (mj > m‘=q0, where 0 < q0 < 1): We regard this as
a strongly counter-intuitive result. Transfers taking place entirely above the
benchmark may also exacerbate inequality, but only if directed to a very much
less needy household type (mj < m‘=q0, where q0 > 1); this seems less
unreasonable. Transfers which are made across the benchmark are unambigu-
ously inequality-reducing regardless of relative needs (because q ¼ m‘
	
mj > q0
is always satisfied if q0 < 0).
Although negative rates of Fleakage_ and rates exceeding 100% have not been
encountered in leaky bucket analytics addressing the welfare effect of transfers
before now,23 and may seem surprising in the inequality context (indeed were
termed Fparadoxical_ by Seidl [35]), the intuition is, after all, quite straightfor-
ward. Tolerance of a leakage exceeding 100% (q0 < 0) occurs when donor and
Frecipient_ are either side of the benchmark. Taking from a rich person (above
the benchmark) unambiguously reduces inequality. This effect is necessarily
reinforced by giving to a poor person (below the benchmark). Hence, having
taken from the rich, one can also take from the poor (up to a certain limit, that
limit beingjq0) without eliminating the inequality gain. Similarly, a negative leak
(q0 > 1) is tolerated when the donor and recipient are both above the benchmark.
Taking $1 from a rich person and giving it to another, less rich but still above the
benchmark, reduces inequality (by the Principle of Transfers); to restore in-
equality to the previous level, one may give extra to the recipient (namely, an
additional amount of q0 j 1). Our analytics have enabled these effects to be
quantified, understood and compared for wide classes of inequality indices.
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Notes
1 One class includes rank-independent indices such as the coefficient of variation, mean
logarithmic deviation, generalized entropy index and Atkinson index; the other, rank-dependent (or
positional) indices such as the Gini and extended Gini coefficients.
2 In this notation, xj
 j

¼ xjþ for all j such that xj m xj + 1 and for a and b suitably restricted,







 is the distribution obtained from x by making a progressive transfer
of  from individual j to individual i.
3 If zero incomes were admitted, then the effect of increasing x1 when x1 = x2 = 0 would be to
shift the Lorenz curve upwards.
4 For the transfer principle to hold, x‘ > xj ) @I=@x‘ > @I
	





5 For a proof of the properties of the mean of order c, see for example Hardy et al. [22,
chapter 1].
6 The transfer sensitive inequality indices are those which adhere to the Principle of
Diminishing Transfers of Kolm [25]. For an index I in the non-positional class, if h0(J) > 0 then
I satisfies Kolm’s principle if and only if u00 > 0 and u000 < 0, and if h0(J) < 0 then I satisfies Kolm’s
principle if and only if u0 0 < 0 and u000 > 0. Thus A(e) is transfer-sensitive for all e, and E(c) is
transfer sensitive for c < 2. The benchmarks for these indices are all below zCV : c < 2 Á zCV >
zE(c) = zA(1j c) (as Figure 1 shows).
7 For a direct proof, just follow similar steps to those in Lambert’s [27, theorem 4.1] proof of
the Pratt theorem. These steps are spelt out explicitly in Lambert and Lanza [28], where additional
material relevant to this paper may also be found.
8 There is a formal link with Kimball’s [24] concept of Fprudence_ in the uncertainty context.
We refrain from calling Pu(z) Fdownside inequality aversion,_ as this would be inconsistent with
Modica and Scarsini’s [30] measure in the uncertainty context of downside risk aversion, which, in
absolute form, is u000 zð Þ=u0 zð Þ. We also refrained from calling Pu(z) Fdownside-mindedness,_
however apt, as this concept belongs to Wilthien [40]. Chiu [9] introduces a measure which he calls
Bthe strength of an index’s downside inequality aversion against its inequality aversion^ that is
ordinally equivalent to our Pu(z). Chiu shows that the magnitude of his measure determines the
ranking by the index of two distributions whose Lorenz curves cross once. Chiu interprets the
raising of one income, low enough in the distribution, as Ba special combination of a downside
inequality increase and an inequality decrease^ (ibid, pp. 16–17).
9 Footnote 6 demonstrates this.
10 For more on the extended Gini coefficient, see Lambert [27, chapter 5].
11 In the case of a continuous distribution function F(x), the Mehran index becomes MF = X0
V
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x!(F(x)) f(x)dx/ where X0
1 w (p)dp = 0 (see Lambert [27] for more on this). In this setting, the
rank-weighting functions for the Gini, extended Gini and S-Gini are !G(p) = 2p j 1, !G(n)(p) =
1jn(1 j p)nj 1 and S(b)(p) = 1 j bp
bj1, respectively. These correspond to the discreteweighting
functions wG(i), wG(n)(i) and wS(b)(i) cited above, making the identification p = i/N and regarding
1/N as an infinitesimal. The rank-weighting function for Aaberge’s [1] Lorenz family of inequality
indices, B(k) where k is a positive integer, is !B ð Þ pð Þ ¼ þ 1ð Þp  1½ =. Notice that if we
extend the functional forms defining G(n) and S(b) to all non-zero parameter values, then jG(n)
belongs to our positional class for n < 1 and jS(b) belongs to it for b > 1. An inequality index
outlined inWang and Tsui [38] takes the form J(c) = sign (c j 1)[G(c)j S(c)], 0 < c m 1, and hence
belongs to our class too. Another class of Fgeneralized Gini_ indices, due to Aaberge [2], in which
the weights depend on Lorenz curve values L(p) rather than positions p, does not fall within the
scope of our general form in (9a)–(9b). See also Chakravarty [7].
12 The form in (9a) can be extended to 1, with the loss of differentiability, if the weights when
xi = xi + 1 are made the same for persons i and i + 1, and equal to [w(i) + w(i + 1)]/2 . Without this
change, a small amount taken from person i and given to person i + 1 would increase inequality,
whereas the same amount taken from person i + 1 and given to person i would reduce it – yet the
final income distribution would be the same in both cases.
13 Pendakur [33], addressing a slightly different question, identifies a unique threshold position
(percentile) for the S-Gini, such that a lump-sum transfer from all agents but one, to that one, either
raises or lowers inequality depending on whether the recipient is above or below the threshold
position. See footnote 12, ibid.
14 The positional index M of (9a)–(9b) satisfies the strong version of the Positional Principle of
Transfer Sensitivity when w(i + 1) j w(i) is positive and strictly decreasing in i, or !00 (p) < 0 8p 2
(0,1). See Mehran [29, p. 808], Zoli [44] and Chateauneuf et al. [8, theorem 9] for more on this.
Note that wG(n)(i + 1) j w G(n)(i) = N{[(N j i + 1)/N]
n + [(N j i j 1)/N]n j 2[(N j i)/N]n} =
2N[E(Yn) j (E(Y))n] where Y is a random variable with realizations (N j i + 1)/N and (N j i j 1)/
N each with probability one half. This is strictly positive because Yn is a convex function of Y for
n > 1. Similarly, by a slight abuse of notation, ¯[wG(n)(i + 1) j wG(n)(i)]/¯i = j2n[E(Y
nj 1) j
(E(Y))nj 1], which is negative for n > 2, zero for n = 2 and positive for n < 2. G(n) thus satisfies the
strong version of the Positional Principle only for n > 2.
15 In particular, the Gini coefficient is excluded. In Aaberge [1, pp. 648–9], criteria for the
positional principle to apply to restricted classes of distributions are explored, which allow for
negative lower tail concern, and in particular a role is found for the Gini coefficient. Yaari’s [42]
Fequality-mindedness_ measure for the positional indices, which in our notation is j!0(p)/[1 j
!(p)], is based upon a leaky bucket experiment: see footnote 17 ahead for more on this.
16 It is a general property that if a function g(.) is strictly monotonic, either increasing or
decreasing, and if d = [g(a) j g(b)]/[g(c) j g(b)], where a > c, then d < 0 if a > b > c, d > 1 if a >
c > b, and 0 < d < 1 if b > a > c.
17 Yaari’s [42] equality–mindedness measure concerns a leaky bucket.Yaari suggests a thought
experiment whereby the incomes of a given fractile of the poor are raised, at the expense of
lowering the incomes of a certain fractile of the rich. A more equality–minded index M, he argues,
would tolerate a bigger fractile of donors than a less equality-minded one, before regarding the
Fleak_ entailed as detrimental. Thus his leaks involve a loss of mass, whereas ours involve a loss of
income.
18 A demonstration that (18) holds may be found in Lambert and Lanza [28]. For the Atkinson
index with e = 1, l = 1 j xj/, whilst for the Gini coefficient, l = [G j w( j)]/[1 j w( j)] where
w( j) = (2j j N j 1)/N, which can also be written l = [kG* j j]/[N + 1/2 j j]. Camacho-Cuena et al.
[6] point out that the corresponding welfare function based on the generalized entropy inequality
index, which would be [1 j E(c)], is in general non-monotonic: see their Theorem 14.
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19 Our analytics can in fact be extended to other types of index, for example to the variance of
logarithms which, though not Lorenz consistent (Foster and Ok [19]), is popular among applied
economists. The variance of logarithms has geometric mean income ~ as its benchmark, and the





lnxjln~ : see Lambert and Lanza [28, page
23].
20 See Lambert [27, p. 131] and Duclos et al. [17] for an inequality index in this form which
merges the Gini coefficient and Atkinson index.
21 In Lambert [26], a labour supply model was investigated, in which wage rates were
lognormally distributed and a piecewise linear negative income tax scheme was applied. It was
shown that, for a wide range of tax and benefit parameter values, the efficiency loss of the tax-
transfer system exceeded the size of the bucket.
22 These requirements stem from (13), which shows that the inequality effect dI of the transfer is
a negative or positive function of q, respectively.
23 But see the very recent article of Camacho-Cuena et al. [6], in which leaky bucket analytics
have been extended to the social welfare function [1 j E(c)] (cf. footnote 18), for which a
benchmark income level is shown to exist with analogous properties for leaky transfers to those of
our Theorem 6. Experiments are also conducted in this paper, in which student subjects coached in
the transfer principle and basic welfare considerations were shown a hypothetical 7-person income
distribution, and asked to adjust a named recipient’s income each time another recipient’s income
was raised or lowered by a small amount, and to make the adjustment such that Bthe degree of
income inequality within this society should be maintained^ (p. 12). The authors’ main finding is
that their subjects’ behaviour patterns did not accord with the leaky bucket analytics developed
here, but instead followed a Fcompensating justice_ hypothesis, for which Bincome inequality
measurement needs to be restructured along special axioms if it should comply.^ Here is another
area for possible theoretical development and refinement.
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